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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Julie Ellen McConnell *
Gregory Franklin **
Craig Winston Stallard *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys developments in criminal law and proce-
dure in Virginia from July 2001 to September 2002. The article
attempts to provide a summary of both the most important cases
decided during that time by the Supreme Court of Virginia and
the Virginia Court of Appeals and significant legislation concern-
ing crime and punishment enacted into law during the 2002 Gen-
eral Assembly Session. While not a complete synopsis of every
case or new law, this article includes those developments that, in
the judgment of these authors, represent departures from previ-
ously established legal principles or clarify important areas of the
law.
II. RESTRICTION OF BAKER CLAIMS
In 2001, we saw the effective demise of an area of litigation
that had previously produced a large number of actions and re-
sulted in a significant number of vacated convictions, often with
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the result that the cases could not practically be retried due to
the passage of time and loss of evidence.
The seminal case was Baker v. Commonwealth,1 in which the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that the failure to notify the par-
ents of a juvenile defendant of the institution of proceedings
against the juvenile, as required by the then-applicable provisions
of Virginia Code sections 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, prohibited the
juvenile court from retaining jurisdiction over the matter.2 The
court held that the lack of jurisdiction rendered the case's trans-
fer to circuit court, as well as any conviction therein, void,
thereby requiring the conviction to be vacated by the court of ap-
peals.3
The initial court of appeals decision in Baker was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Commonwealth v. Baker,4 in
which the court also ruled that its judgment would apply retroac-
tively.5 In March of 2000, the court held in Moore v. Common-
wealth6 that, even where a contemporaneous objection was not
made to the lack of parental notice, the convictions were never-
theless void because the defect was jurisdictional and not subject
to waiver by the juvenile either in the juvenile court or the circuit
court.7 Three justices dissented from the holding in Moore, how-
ever, and it proved to be the high-water mark of the Baker claim
era.
8
On September 14, 2001, the Supreme Court of Virginia ren-
dered two opinions that effectively extinguished the use of Baker
claims other than by direct appeal. In Nelson v. Warden,9 the
court overruled Moore and adopted Justice Kinser's dissent in
that case, holding that the petitioner's "convictions were merely
voidable," not void ab initio, and thus Moore's failure to raise the
issue in a timely manner constituted a waiver of the error.1"
1. 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 399; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-263, -264 (Repl. Vol.
1999).
3. 28 Va. App. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 399.
4. 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam).
5. Id. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 219.
6. 259 Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000).
7. Id. at 440, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
8. Id. at 441, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
9. 262 Va. 276, 552 S.E.2d 73 (2001).
10. Id. at 285, 552 S.E.2d at 78.
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Three justices dissented from the new majority's ruling in Nel-
son.
11
On the same day, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Com-
monwealth v. Southerly12 that the Virginia Court of Appeals did
not have jurisdiction to hear a Baker claim that had originated in
the circuit court as a motion to vacate a void conviction.1" This
was because the statute governing the court of appeals' appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, Virginia Code section 17.1-406(A),
restricted the court's jurisdiction to appeals "'from ... any final
conviction in a circuit court of... a crime."'14 This language was
held not to encompass "a motion to vacate filed long after the
conviction has become final and seeking a declaration that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to take the action that is sought to
be vacated." 5 Such an action was held to be "definitely civil in na-
ture" rather than criminal, and therefore properly within the
original jurisdiction of the supreme court; thus, the court of ap-
peals should have transferred the case to the supreme court.
16
Relying on Southerly, the Virginia Court of Appeals later trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia, in addition to pending
Baker claims, 17 an appeal of a circuit court order revoking a de-
fendant's probation," and an appeal from a circuit court's refusal
to set aside defendant's guilty plea that had been filed more than
twenty-one days after judgment. 9 In each instance, the court of
appeals held that, after the Southerly ruling, original jurisdiction
over such actions is properly within the supreme court.2 ° The su-
preme court disagreed, however, holding that a revocation was a
criminal proceeding2"-despite dictum in an earlier opinion to the
11. Id. at 285-93, 552 S.E.2d at 78-82 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
12. 262 Va. 294, 551 S.E.2d 650 (2001).
13. Id. at 296, 551 S.E.2d at 653.
14. Id. at 299, 551 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-406(A) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Green v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 92, 93, 554 S.E.2d 108, 109 (Ct. App.
2001).
19. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 97, 99-102, 554 S.E.2d 111, 112-13
(Ct. App. 2001).
20. See Green, 37 Va. App. at 93, 554 S.E.2d at 109; see also Williams, 37 Va. App. at
99, 554 S.E.2d at 113.
21. Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191, 195, 557 S.E.2d 230, 232 (2002).
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contrary.22 The court also held that "because a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea [was] designed by statute to be filed and dis-
posed of while the circuit court still retains jurisdiction over the
case, such a motion [was] criminal in nature" and thus belonged
in the court of appeals.2" The supreme court transferred both
cases back to the court of appeals.24
22. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 235, 242, 321 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1984), held
otherwise. The Green court in discussing Heacock stated:
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a different result is
required by our decision in Heacock. There, we held that while a forfeiture
proceeding on a bond entered in a criminal case is a purely civil matter, the
surety is entitled to due process protections of notice and a hearing prior to
forfeiture. We also stated in dictum that proceedings to revoke probation are
civil in nature.
Our holding today is incompatible with this dictum, which we expressly re-
ject. Although a probation revocation hearing is not a stage of a criminal
prosecution and thus does not afford a convict all rights attending a criminal
prosecution, such revocation hearing is nevertheless a criminal proceeding.
Green, 263 Va. at 195-96, 557 S.E.2d 232-33 (citations omitted).
23. Williams v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 189, 189, 557 S.E.2d 233, 233 (2002) (citing
Southerly, 262 Va. at 299, 551 S.E.2d at 653); see VA. CODE ANN. § 171-406(A) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
24. Green, 263 Va. at 196, 557 S.E.2d at 233; Williams, 263 Va. at 190, 557 S.E.2d at
[Vol. 37:45
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT 25
A. Standing /Expectation of Privacy
To determine whether an individual has standing to bring a
Fourth Amendment claim, "the relevant inquiry... is whether a
person has an expectation of privacy. Significantly, the privacy
expectation, and consequent constitutional protection, attaches to
people, not to places or things."26 In McCray v. Commonwealth,27
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that where an individual de-
stroyed property in his hotel room and the officers had reason to
believe that he "smash[ed] things," as a matter of law, the defen-
dant no longer maintained an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in the room.28
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the con-
tents of a wrapped parcel were unquestionably subject to protec-
tion by the Fourth Amendment, "a party has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the size, weight or other exterior
characteristics of a package or parcel placed into the stream of
25. For consistency purposes the authors employed the same article structure adopted
by the authors of the 2001 Annual Survey article on criminal law. See William J. Dinkin &
Cullen D. Selzer, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 537
(2001). Titling the section headings after the first ten amendments of the Constitution
serves as
a shorthand means of describing which component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is at issue. This is necessarily so because the
first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution do not apply to the states;
rather, many of the protections afforded by those amendments have been in-
corporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
expressly applies to the states.
Id. at 538 n.1. Dinkin and Selzer cite to the United States Supreme Court's explanation in
Duncan v. Louisiana that "[blecause we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fun-
damental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a fed-
eral court - would come with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." Id. (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (alteration in original). Dinkin and Selzer further ex-
plained that "[tihe modern trend in incorporation theory is that of 'selective incorporation,'
whereby rights deemed to be 'fundamental' are 'incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and applied to the states to the same extent that [they] appl[y] to the federal govern-
ment."' Id. (quoting JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 43 (1997)) (alterations in original).
26. Dinkin & Selzer, supra note 25, at 540 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967); see also ISRAEL, supra note 25, at 73-74).
27. 36 Va. App. 27, 548 S.E.2d 239 (Ct. App. 2001).
28. Id. at 38, 548 S.E.2d at 245.
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commerce."" Thus, given the officers' observation of several sus-
picious characteristics, such as the place of origin, the size and
weight of the package, the method of mailing, and the handwrit-
ten label addressed to and from a business, the officers had a rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion to briefly seize the item and allow it
to be checked by a drug dog."
B. Search Warrants
In Whitaker v. Commonwealth,3 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that a search warrant that police had held for six days before
they conducted the search was not stale where it was reasonable
to believe the alleged conduct at defendant's home was ongoing.32
The court held, however, that the warrant did not justify the de-
tention of the defendant personally after he was followed by car
for a mile and a half from his home.3 The drugs on his person as
well as his statements derived from the seizure were sup-
pressed. 4
In a case of first impression, the Virginia Court of Appeals re-
viewed a case in which police officers executed a search warrant
for narcotics at a location known for drug trafficking. 5 The court
held that a person of "reasonable caution" would surely deem a
protective frisk of the occupants on the premises necessary for the
safety of all concerned, even though the warrant had not directed
29. Hurley v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 83, 89, 548 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2001)
(citations omitted).
30. See id. at 89-90, 548 S.E.2d at 269.
31. 37 Va. App. 21, 553 S.E.2d 539 (Ct. App. 2001).
32. See id. The court stated:
Here, the warrant was issued based upon probable cause to believe the in-
formant had witnessed Whitaker sell marijuana from his home and that "a
quantity of marijuana remained for sell [sic]." The delay of six days between
issuing the warrant and the search, standing alone, did not vitiate the rea-
sonable belief that contraband would be on the premises and in the posses-
sion of Whitaker, the occupant described by the informant. The fact that the
remaining drugs were described as a "quantity" significant enough for con-
tinued sale, and that they were being offered for sale from a particular resi-
dence, suggests a continuing enterprise. Indeed, we have held that "[t]he sell-
ing of drugs, by its nature, is an ongoing activity."
Id. at 29-30, 553 S.E.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 34, 553 S.E.2d at 543.
34. Id.
35. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 556, 561, 559 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ct. App.
2002).
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such action. 6 The court distinguished Ybarra v. Illinois,37 which
held that a warrant for the search of a public bar for drugs did
not permit a frisk of the patrons of the bar.3" The Murphy court
did "not see a weapons frisk at a location known for drug traffick-
ing as falling within the ambit of a generalized cursory search in
a public place as prohibited by Ybarra."39
In Al-Karrien v. Commonwealth,4" the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in a
cup of soup that he set on a counter when ordered to do so by a
police officer." Moreover, the court found that the defendant did
not abandon the soup by failing to reclaim it. 2 The officers found
seven bags of crack cocaine in the soup, but only after stirring it.43
Therefore, the court of appeals found that because the cocaine
was not in plain view there was no probable cause for Al-
Karrien's arrest.44
C. Warrantless Searches of Premises and Vehicles
In Hargraves v. Commonwealth,45 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held "that the dispatch of the police pursuant to a contract
[with an alarm company] for home security and the sounding of
the home's alarm," did not provide police who arrived on the
scene with authority to conduct a full criminal investigation of
the premises. 6 The court rejected the Commonwealth's conten-
tion that consent to such a search was implicit in the contract. 7
Because the police conducted the search in this case without a
warrant or valid consent, it was unlawful and the evidence ob-
tained as a result of the illegal search was inadmissible.
36. Id. at 567, 559 S.E.2d at 894.
37. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
38. Id. at 91.
39. Murphy, 37 Va. App. at 571, 559 S.E.2d at 896-97.
40. 38 Va. App. 35, 561 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2002).
41. See id. at 45, 561 S.E.2d at 752.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 41, 561 S.E.2d at 750.
44. Id. at 48, 561 S.E. 2d at 754.
45. 37 Va. App. 299, 557 S.E.2d 737 (Ct. App. 2002).
46. Id. at 312, 557 S.E.2d at 743.
47. Id. at 308, 557 S.E.2d at 741.
48. Id. at 312, 557 S.E.2d at 743.
2002]
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The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Megel v. Commonwealth,'9
held that an accused's home may not be subjected to a war-
rantless search by police while the accused is serving a sentence
in the so-called Electronic Incarceration Program pursuant to
Virginia Code section 53.1-131.2(A).5 Reversing an en banc deci-
sion by the Virginia Court of Appeals,52 the supreme court held
that the lower court erred in ruling that Megel's entrance into the
program converted his home into "'the functional equivalent of a
jail or prison cell,' resulting in the loss of his Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures."53 There-
fore, Megel did not waive his Fourth Amendment rights by exe-
cuting the agreement to enter the program.54
In a later case, Bolden v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court
of Virginia considered the effect of consent to a search given when
the citizen is detained by the police.56 The supreme court has es-
tablished that seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when
"'by means of physical force or a show of authority, [an individ-
ual's] freedom of movement is restrained.' 57 The officers stopped
Bolden, intercepted a phone call meant for him, and blocked his
car when he tried to leave.5' He ultimately consented to a search
of his trunk, where the police found contraband.59 The court held
that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, that
his consent was not voluntary, and that the trial court should
have suppressed the drugs.60
D. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
Police reliance on anonymous tips received considerable atten-
tion from the Virginia Court of Appeals in the past year. In
49. 262 Va. 531, 551 S.E.2d 638 (2001).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.2 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
51. Megel, 262 Va. at 533, 551 S.E.2d at 639.
52. Megel v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 648, 536 S.E.2d 451 (Ct. App. 2000) (en
banc).
53. Megel, 262 Va. at 537, 551 S.E.2d at 642.
54. Id.
55. 263 Va. 465, 561 S.E.2d 701 (2002).
56. Id. at 470, 561 S.E.2d at 704.
57. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)).
58. Id. at 472, 561 S.E.2d at 705.
59. Id. at 469, 561 S.E.2d at 703.
60. Id. at 472, 561 S.E.2d at 705.
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Ramey v. Commonwealth,6 the court of appeals concluded that
the anonymous tip did not have the indicia of reliability sufficient
to justify the initial stop of Ramey's vehicle.62 The tip provided a
description of the car, its license number, its last known location,
and indicated that the black male driver was "somehow" involved
in a fatal gang shooting the previous day.63 However, the tip re-
layed "no further information as to the source of the report or in
what capacity the black male was involved in the shooting."
4
Thus, the record was devoid of any basis by which to credit the
dispatch; although it accurately described the vehicle, the occu-
pants, and their location, that sort of information was "readily ob-
servable" to anyone.65 The tip "disclosed no knowledge of 'con-
cealed criminal activity' or 'ability to predict respondent's future
behavior."''
In Harris v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered an anonymous tip that a black male was selling drugs
at a certain location near a public housing development. 68 The
anonymous tipster identified the individual as "Mart Harris," in-
dicated that Harris was wearing jeans, a white T-shirt, and a
checkered jacket, and claimed that he was armed.69 Police ob-
served an individual fitting the description with two companions
but did not observe any conduct indicating the presence of guns
or drugs.7° The men were unfamiliar to the officers and were in
an area posted "no trespassing."71 The court stated the following
in ruling that the facts available to the officers did not support a
seizure:
The Commonwealth relies upon the information of the anonymous
tipster that Harris was armed as justification for heightening [the
police officer's] inchoate "hunch" that Harris was trespassing to the
level of a reasonable, articulable suspicion. In doing so, the Com-
61. 35 Va. App. 624, 547 S.E.2d 519 (Ct. App. 2001).
62. Id. at 632, 547 S.E.2d at 523.
63. Id. at 627, 547 S.E.2d at 521.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 632, 547 S.E.2d at 523.
66. Id. at 632, 547 S.E.2d at 524 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Ala-
bama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)).
67. 262 Va. 407, 551 S.E.2d 606 (2001).
68. Id. at 410, 551 S.E.2d at 607.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 410-11, 551 S.E.2d at 607.
2002]
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monwealth bootstraps the legitimate concern for law enforcement of-
ficers' safety, which permits a protective search of a legally detained
suspect, to serve as the basis for detaining the suspect. However, the
issue before this Court is not whether [the officer] could, based on
the information in the tip that Harris was armed, conduct the pro-
tective pat-down had Harris been otherwise lawfully detained, but
whether [the officer] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to war-
rant detaining Harris in the first place. 72
Because the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion,
the evidence was suppressed.73
The Virginia Court of Appeals held in Reed v. Commonwealth74
that where a tipster maintained his phone connection with the
dispatcher and continued to provide information as police con-
verged on the scene, the informant was not a "wholly anonymous"
tipster 75 as that term was contemplated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Florida v. J.L.76 The informant was characterized
as "a disinterested citizen who had just witnessed a crime."77 By
the time the officer approached the suspect, he had received con-
firmation that the window of a nearby parked car had been bro-
ken into as reported by the informant.7" Thus, the court ruled
that the evidence established that the tip was "'reliable in its as-
sertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determi-
nant person,"' and the court ruled the seizure to be valid.79
E. Roadblocks
Over the past year, there were three relevant cases dealing
with roadblocks. The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Palmer v.
Commonwealth"° that the Commonwealth need not demonstrate
72. Id. at 416, 551 S.E.2d at 611.
73. Id.
74. 36 Va. App. 260, 549 S.E.2d 616 (Ct. App. 2001).
75. Id. at 268, 549 S.E.2d at 620.
76. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
77. Reed, 36 Va. App. at 268, 549 S.E.2d at 620.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 325, 331, 533 S.E.2d 18, 21 (Ct.App. 2001) (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000))). The court of appeals decision in
Harris was reversed. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
80. 36 Va. App. 169, 549 S.E.2d 29 (Ct. App. 2001).
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either site-specific or time-specific law enforcement reasons why a
particular traffic checkpoint was established."1
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Wesley v. Common-
wealth12 that leaving to the officers' discretion how long to operate
the checkpoint, within the parameters of thirty minutes and two
hours, did not amount to unbridled discretion invalidating the ar-
rest. 3
Distinguishing the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
Bass v. Commonwealth,4 the Virginia Court of Appeals held in
Lovelace v. Commonwealth"5 that a driver's suspicious activity
was sufficiently unusual to support an investigative stop. 6 Un-
like Bass, which involved a driver making a U-turn into a gas sta-
tion 500 yards before the checkpoint, 7 Lovelace involved a driver
confronted by a roadblock thirty-five yards ahead of him. 8 He
stopped, hesitated, and after looking toward the roadblock,
turned into a driveway, and proceeded more than half-way
through the driveway without stopping.8 9
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
Defendants argued a variety of double jeopardy claims over the
last year, but few met with success. The United States Constitu-
tion guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."9 ° This Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy "has been held to
consist of three guarantees: (1) '[it protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [(2)] It protects
81. Id. at 177, 549 S.E.2d at 33.
82. 37 Va. App. 128, 554 S.E.2d 691 (Ct. App. 2001).
83. Id. at 134, 554 S.E.2d at 694.
84. 259 Va. 470, 525 S.E.2d 921 (2000) (holding that the detention of a driver who
made a U-turn before entering a checkpoint violated his Fourth Amendment Rights).
85. 37 Va. App. 120, 554 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 2001).
86. Id. at 126, 554 S.E.2d at 690.
87. Bass, 259 Va. at 477, 525 S.E.2d at 925.
88. Lovelace, 37 Va. App. at 126, 554 S.E.2d at 690.
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20021
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against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
[(3)] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense."''
In Dalo v. Commonwealth,92 the defendant was charged with
driving under the influence ("DUI") and with involuntary man-
slaughter.9 3 The preliminary hearing and trial for these charges
were held together in general district court, and defendant was
convicted of DUI.94 On appeal in the circuit court, Dalo claimed
that he could not be prosecuted on the involuntary manslaughter
charge as he had already been convicted of the DUI charge, which
the Commonwealth conceded at trial was a lesser-included of-
fense.95 The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that because the leg-
islature clearly intended to allow multiple punishments for these
offenses, the prosecution did not offend the double jeopardy
clause.96
In Brown v. Commonwealth,97 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the offenses of robbery and carjacking were separate
crimes committed by separate acts and that the defendant was
properly charged with and convicted of both offenses.9" The court
concluded that:
[T]he General Assembly made it clear that conviction for the offense
of caijacking does not prohibit the Commonwealth from pursuing
any other crime an offender commits while the carijacking is in pro-
gress. [Virginia] Code § 18.2-58.1(C) provides: "The provisions of this
section shall not preclude the applicability of any other provision of
the criminal law of the Commonwealth which may apply to any
course of conduct which violates this section."99
91. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969)) (alterations in original).
92. 37 Va. App. 156, 554 S.E.2d 705 (Ct. App. 2001).
93. Id. at 160-61, 554 S.E.2d at 707. The defendant was charged under Virginia Code
sections 18.2-36.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002) (involuntary manslaughter) and 18.2-266 (Repl.
Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (driving under the influence). Id. Virginia Code section
18.2-36.1(A) contemplates a killing resulting from driving under the influence. Id. at 18.2-
36.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
94. Dalo, 37 Va. App. at 160-61, 554 S.E.2d at 707.
95. Id. at 161-62, 554 S.E.2d at 707.
96. Id. at 169, 554 S.E.2d at 711.
97. 37 Va. App. 507, 559 S.E.2d 415 (Ct. App. 2002).
98. Id. at 514-16, 559 S.E.2d at 419-20.
99. Id. at 518, 559 S.E.2d at 421 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1(c) (Repl. Vol.
1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002)).
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In Gray v. Commonwealth,'00 the Virginia Court of Appeals
ruled that, where the circuit court dismissed an earlier indict-
ment on defendant's motion because it alleged an offense that had
not been enacted at the time of the conduct in question, a later
indictment under the former code section was not barred by dou-
ble jeopardy.1"' This was because the dismissal was grounded
upon a legal infirmity in the charging instrument, in contrast to
an adjudication of factual issues.0 2
In Kenyon v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that no double jeopardy issue was raised where, in circuit
court, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss by nolle prosequi a
charge that had been appealed from the general district court.0 4
The Commonwealth then proceeded to obtain a new warrant
which resulted in a second general district court conviction, fol-
lowed by a second appeal to the circuit court and a conviction
there. ' 5 As a matter of law, defendant's appeal of the first gen-
eral district court conviction rendered that conviction a nullity.0 6
In the first appeal to the circuit court, no jeopardy attached be-
cause there was a nolle prosequi before the defendant was put in
jeopardy.0 7 Thus, for double jeopardy purposes, it was as if the
first round of proceedings never existed at all, and, consequently,
the second round resulted in a valid conviction.
08
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Commonwealth v. Washing-
ton, '9 held that a defendant's failure to make an express objection
to the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was an implicit waiver
of any subsequent claim on double jeopardy grounds."0 In this
case, the trial court declared a mistrial sua sponte when there
appeared to be an insufficient number of jurors to proceed with
the trial"' The trial court's statements in the record clearly indi-
100. 37 Va. App. 353, 558 S.E.2d 545 (Ct. App. 2002).
101. Id. at 359, 558 S.E.2d at 548.
102. Id.
103. 37 Va. 668, 561 S.E.2d 17 (2002).
104. Id. at 671-72, 561 S.E.2d at 19.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 675, 561 S.E.2d at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 263 Va. 298, 559 S.E.2d 636 (2002).
110. Id. at 304-05, 559 S.E.2d at 639.
111. Id. at 300-02, 559 S.E.2d at 637-38.
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cated it was aware that the defense would claim double jeopardy
in the event of a retrial, which it did.112 The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that a second trial in these circumstances violated
double jeopardy and dismissed the conviction,"' but the supreme
court reversed and reinstated the conviction. 114
The supreme court noted that defense counsel presented very
clear objections at trial, but that she had not specifically objected
to the mistrial announced by the court and had even participated
in setting a new date for trial.'15 The failure to voice a definitive
objection to the mistrial resulted in a waiver of double jeopardy
protection."6 Justice Koontz wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Lacy and Keenan, pointing out that procedural bar was
inappropriate where it was abundantly clear that the trial judge
was informed of the issues engendered by the declaration of the
mistrial, that the defendant did not consent to the mistrial, and
that the defendant asserted the bar of double jeopardy to the re-
trial.17
B. Right Against Self-Incrimination-Miranda Protections
In Commonwealth v. Gregory,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that, even assuming defendant's statement "I think I should
talk to my lawyer," was an invocation of his right to counsel, his
confession to police that occurred over a week after his release
from the initial custody was admissible." 9 The break in custody
rendered inapplicable the rule of Edwards v. Arizona2 ° against
re-initiation of questioning by police after a demand for a law-
yer. 2' Conversely, in Potts v. Commonwealth,'22 a defendant's
own re-initiation of conversation with police after a request for a
112. Id.
113. Washington v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 202, 220, 543 S.E.2d 638, 646 (Ct.
App. 2001).
114. Washington, 263 Va. at 306, 559 S.E.2d at 640.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 304-05, 559 S.E.2d at 639.
117. Id. at 306-14, 559 S.E.2d at 640-45 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
118. 263 Va. 134, 557 S.E.2d 715 (2002).
119. Id. at 148-50, 557 S.E.2d at 723-24.
120. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
121. Gregory, 263 Va. at 149, 557 S.E.2d at 724.
122. 35 Va. App. 485, 546 S.E.2d 229 (Ct. App. 2001).
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lawyer during the initial interview was held by the Virginia
Court of Appeals to constitute a waiver of his Miranda rights. 123
The Supreme Court of Virginia later ruled in Commonwealth v.
Redmond124 that the accused statement's-" [c] an I speak to my
lawyer? I can't even talk to my lawyer before I make any kind of
comments or anything?"-did not constitute a "clear and unambi-
guous" request for council.125 In the plurality opinion, the court
applied a de novo standard of review to determine whether the
circuit court erred in holding that the "statements did not reflect
an unambiguous, unequivocal invocation of [the defendant's]
right to counsel." '126 In support of its conclusion the court cited to
the "context of the defendant's questions, the tone of his voice, his
voice inflections, and his demeanor" as indicating ambiguity as to
a request for counsel. 127 The court suggested that the statement
could have merely constituted a request for a further explanation
of his Miranda rights and not a request for counsel.12 These fac-
tors led the court to hold that a "reasonable police officer" would
not have interpreted the defendant's statements as an invocation
of his right to counsel. 129 Therefore the defendant's confession to
police in the same interrogation was admissible.13 °
Justice Kinser, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Lacy
and Lemons, sidestepped the issue of the potential violation of
the right to council and asserted that so much "overwhelming
evidence" existed that pointed toward the defendant's guilt as to
render mute the issue of the admissibility of the confession.
131
Thus, even if the admission into evidence of the confession was in
error, the "error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 132
The dissent, authored by Justice Koontz, roundly rejected the
analysis of the plurality opinion and suggested that there could
be no more clear request for counsel than the statement "[c]an I
123. Id. at 495, 546 S.E.2d at 234.
124. No. 012447, 2002 Va. LEXIS 105 (Va. Sept. 13, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id. at *5-6.
127. Id. at *14.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *15.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *17 (Kinser, J., concurring).
132. Id. at *16 (Kinser, J., concurring).
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speak to my lawyer." 33 He stated that "[ilt requires an almost to-
tal disregard for human experience to conclude that in such cir-
cumstances a reasonable police officer would not have understood
that Redmond was requesting counsel.. ,,1' Additionally, the
Justice rejected the characterization of the admission as harmless
error. 135 He argued that the confession provided the only inde-
pendent evidence of certain key facts of the crime and should not
have been admitted.136
In Belmer v. Commonwealth,3 v the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that no exclusion was required as to statements made by a
juvenile defendant to his mother and her boyfriend when left
alone by police in an interrogation room. 3 ' When the boy said he
wanted to talk to a lawyer the detective simply left the room, but
secretly listened in on the conversation electronically. 13 The court
found it important that the detective did not improperly "lull"
them into a feeling of security or tell them the conversation would
be private; thus they were held to have no expectation of privacy
in the interrogation room. 4 '
In Thomas v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that an officer's arrest of Thomas based on contraband he
found near the area, but not in the area, in which he had seen
Thomas make a throwing motion, did not provide probable cause
133. Id. at *21 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at *22 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at *23 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at *24 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
137. 36 Va. App. 448, 553 S.E.2d 123 (Ct. App. 2001).
138. Id. at 461-62, 553 S.E.2d at 129.
139. Id. at 452-53, 553 S.E.2d at 125.
140. Id. at 461, 553 S.E.2d at 129. The court addressed the effect of the Interception of
Wire, Electronic or Oral Communications Act to determine if the officer had violated its
provisions. Id. at 454-55, 553 S.E.2d at 125-30 (discussing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to -
70.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002)). The court held he had not because the circumstances did not jus-
tify the expectation of noninterception. Id. at 454-56, 553 S.E.2d at 125-30. Judge Elder
dissented, stating:
I would hold that a right of family privacy protecting certain communications
between parents and children is implicit in Virginia law and protects the
conversation at issue in this case. Even in the absence of such a privacy right,
I would hold that appellant's subjective expectation of privacy in the inter-
view room was one that society should be prepared to recognize as reasonable
under the facts of this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 462, 553 S.E.2d at 129-30 (Elder, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
141. 38 Va. App. 49, 561 S.E.2d 754 (Ct. App. 2002).
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for his arrest.1 2 Moreover, the court held that the trial court
erred in admitting Thomas's statement, which flowed directly
from his unlawful arrest.
143
V. DUE PROCESS
A. Indictments
In Gardner v. Commonwealth,44 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that, although the indictment alleged that defendant had ob-
tained money described as the property of her grandfather by
false pretenses, the evidence showed that the bank was the actual
victim of the offense. 145 The loss was attributed to the bank be-
cause the grandfather's account was not debited and he incurred
no loss. 146 Since the Commonwealth alleged in the indictment
that the money obtained by the defendant was the property of
Gardner, but the evidence showed the money was the property of
the bank, it proved a different offense, resulting in a fatal vari-
ance requiring dismissal of the indictment.
147
The Supreme Court of Virginia also held in Powell v. Com-
monwealth,148 a capital murder case, that the court could not
make a pretrial amendment to an indictment that materially
changed the nature of the offense originally charged by allowing
the use of a gradation offense the grand jury had never consid-
ered. 149
B. Right to Evidence
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Chase v. Common-
wealth 5 ° that the alleged "denial" of a potentially exculpatory
blood test, in addition to the usual breath test, was not a violation
142. Id. at 54-55, 561 S.E. 2d at 756.
143. Id. at 55, 561 S.E.2d at 757.
144. 262 Va. 18, 546 S.E.2d 686 (2001).
145. Id. at 20, 546 S.E.2d at 687.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 25, 546 S.E.2d at 690.
148. 261 Va. 512, 544 S.E.2d 679 (2001).
149. Id. at 538-39, 544 S.E.2d at 694-95.
150. 37 Va. App. 194, 555 S.E.2d 422 (Ct. App. 2001).
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of due process.' The defendant, after registering a .10 on the
breath test, called his attorney who then asked the trooper to
transport defendant to the hospital for an independent blood
test.15 2 The trooper refused this request. 53 The defendant argued
this refusal violated due process by denying him the opportunity
to obtain exculpatory evidence.' However, the court ruled that
no federal due process violation occurred because defendant was
not prevented from obtaining the evidence he sought; the defen-
dant, not the trooper, had the responsibility to arrange for the
second test. 55
In Smoot v. Commonwealth,'56 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the Commonwealth is required to disclose all of the de-
fendant's written and recorded statements, irrespective of
whether a law enforcement officer is the recipient.'57 Conse-
quently, the court held that the trial court's ruling that Smoot's
inculpatory letters written to his fellow inmates were not encom-
passed by the court's discovery order was error.5 5 However, the
court found this did not constitute reversible error because the
Commonwealth's late disclosure of inculpatory evidence did not
prejudice the defendant's case. 9
VI. TRIAL AND ITS INCIDENTS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
One of the most common issues on appeal is whether the evi-
dence at trial was sufficient to sustain the conviction. When the
sufficiency of the evidence is questioned on appeal, the appellate
court will review the facts in the light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party at trial and will reverse the trial court only if that
151. Id. at 200-01, 555 S.E.2d at 425.
152. Id. at 196-97, 555 S.E.2d at 423.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 197, 555 S.E.2d at 423.
155. Id. at 200-01, 555 S.E.2d at 425.
156. 37 Va. App. 495, 559 S.E.2d 409 (Ct. App. 2002).
157. Id. at 501, 559 S.E.2d at 412.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 502, 559 S.E.2d at 412-13.
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court's decision was plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.160
1. Drug Related Cases
The question of what evidence is sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion for sale of "drug paraphernalia "161 was addressed in Morrison
v. Commonwealth.'6' In that case, the "Fatty Shack," which was
owned by the defendant, was selling water pipes, papers, roach
clips, and other similar products. 163 He was advised by the police
to stop selling the items; however, when the police returned six
months later, the items were still for sale.' 4 The defendant
claimed the Commonwealth must prove he had actual knowledge
that the items were to be used for illegal drugs.'65 In affirming the
conviction, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the Common-
wealth was only required to prove the defendant was aware when
he possessed with the intent to sell, or actually sold the items,
that buyers in general are likely to use them for illegal drugs.
166
This was shown by a sign posted in the store that the items were
not to be used for smoking marijuana.'
67
In Toliver v. Commonwealth,68 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that to find a defendant guilty of the intent to engage in a
drug transaction within 1000 feet of a school, the Commonwealth
must actually prove that the defendant intended to distribute the
drugs in the school zone, not just that he possessed them there. 9
In this case, Toliver was only within 1000 feet of a school because
the police chased him there. 70
In Birdsong v. Commonwealth,'7' the Virginia Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
160. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 218 S.E.2d 534 (1975).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-265.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
162. 37 Va. App. 273, 557 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 2002).
163. Id. at 276, 557 S.E.2d at 725-26.
164. Id. at 276, 557 S.E.2d at 726.
165. Id. at 279, 557 S.E.2d at 727.
166. Id. at 282-83, 557 S.E.2d at 729.
167. Id. at 284, 557 S.E.2d at 730.
168. 38 Va. App. 27, 561 S.E.2d 743 (Ct. App. 2002).
169. Id. at 32-33, 561 S.E.2d at 746.
170. Id. at 29-31, 561 S.E.2d at 744-45.
171. 37 Va. App. 603, 560 S.E.2d 468 (Ct. App. 2002).
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prove constructive possession of drugs and a gun.172 In this case,
the police executed a search warrant at the home of defendant's
mother, where defendant was living.173 In the "male" bedroom,
there was a dresser and safe containing $6,600 in cash and an
ounce of cocaine. 74 The defendant had a key, used the room, and
spent more time at the home than a brother who had a previous
drug arrest.175 In addition, the police found papers and letters ad-
dressed to the defendant-in the room and recovered money from a
sock that contained the defendant's DNA.'76 Looking at the total-
ity of the circumstantial evidence, the court affirmed the trial
court's conviction.177
2. Child Sexual Assault Cases
In Morning v. Commonwealth,78 the Virginia Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of the amount of corroborating evidence nec-
essary to support a confession and sustain a conviction for two
counts of carnal knowledge of a minor.'79 In this case, thirteen-
year-old N.J. ran away from home and was later discovered in the
home of the defendant, age twenty.8 ° At first, the defendant de-
nied that N.J. was with him.'' The defendant later confessed to
police that he engaged in oral sex and sexual intercourse with
172. Id.
173. Id. at 605, 560 S.E.2d at 469.
174. Id. at 606, 560 S.E.2d at 469-70.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 610, 560 S.E.2d 471-72. See also Landes v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App.
710, 561 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding that under Virginia Code section 18.2-115,
when a lienor refuses to disclose location of property on demand of lienholder, there is a
prima facie case of larceny); Rose v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 728, 561 S.E.2d 46 (Ct.
App. 2002) (finding that notice of habitual offender status and directive not to drive do not
have to be proven when defendant pled guilty to a first offense of being a habitual of-
fender); Councill v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 610, 560 S.E.2d 472 (Ct. App. 2002) (hold-
ing that campus police have jurisdiction which includes the streets adjacent to the cam-
pus); Bruhn v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 537, 559 S.E.2d 880 (2002) (holding that proof
of embezzlement is not proof of larceny); Sabol v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 9, 553
S.E.2d 533 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that in two counts of rape where the victim was defen-
dant's stepdaughter, pushing the victim down the hall was sufficient to show proof of
force, threat or intimidation; however, threatening to take away privileges was not suffi-
cient for second count of rape).
178. 37 Va. App. 679, 561 S.E.2d 23 (Ct. App. 2002).
179. Id. at 684-85, 561 S.E.2d at 25.
180. Id. at 682, 561 S.E.2d at 24.
181. Id.
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N.J.1 12 At trial, N.J. at first refused to answer questions, but later
testified that there was no sexual activity between the two of
them."8 3 In affirming the trial court's conviction, the court held
that only slight corroboration is needed to prove the corpus delicti
and N.J.'s testimony corroborated the defendant's testimony on
every point except for the sexual activity.8 4 The trial court did
not believe N.J.'s denial of sexual activity and found that the de-
fendant's attempts to cover-up the relationship further indicated
guilt.1
85
In Commonwealth v. Bower,"8 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the level of intimidation required to sustain a convic-
tion under Virginia Code section 18.2-67.2 for animate object sex-
ual penetration. 8 7 This case involved a father who entered the
bedroom of his thirteen-year-old daughter, "put his hand under-
neath her pajamas and fondled her breasts for a period of five
minutes.... , [and] then placed his hand inside her panties; first
resting his hand on her bare bottom and then putting his finger
into her vagina for a twenty-minute period."8 8 During this epi-
sode, the child faced away from her father and pretended to be
asleep."8 9 About thirty minutes later, Bower got up and left the
room. 9 ° The court reversed the lower court's holding that Bower
had committed the acts without the element of intimidation, cit-
ing testimony proving that the victim was afraid and in pain dur-
ing the assault.'9 ' This testimony, coupled with the familial rela-
tionship and relative age and size of the parties, constituted
sufficient proof that the defendant intimidated the victim and
overcame her will in committing the assault.
9 2
In a case involving indecent liberties with a minor, the Virginia
Court of Appeals held that the "presence" requirement under Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-370 includes being within sight of chil-
182. Id. at 683, 561 S.E.2d at 24.
183. Id. at 683-84, 561 S.E.2d at 25.
184. Id. at 686, 561 S.E.2d at 26.
185. Id.
186. 264 Va. 41, 563 S.E.2d 763 (2002).
187. Id. at 43, 563 S.E.2d at 736-37 (analyzing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67 (Repl. Vol.
2000)).
188. Id. at 43, 563 S.E.2d at 737.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 45-46, 563 S.E.2d at 736-37, 739.
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dren where a reasonable probability exists of being seen. 9 3 In this
case, the court found that the defendant was in the presence of
children while standing inside his home with his genitals exposedin front of glass doors and across the street from a daycare facil-
ity.194
3. Perjury
In Donati v. Commonwealth,95 the Virginia Court of Appeals
reviewed what evidence is necessary to prove perjury.'96 During a
revocation hearing for a prior conviction, the Commonwealth in-
troduced a videotape which purported to show the defendant ex-
posing himself and masturbating in a public building.' 97 The de-
fendant testified under oath that he was the person on the
videotape, but denied exposing himself or masturbating. 98 As a
result of that testimony, the defendant was charged with per-jury. 9 At the trial for perjury, the Commonwealth introduced thetape and a witness who identified the defendant entering the
building. °° The Commonwealth presented no evidence, however,
as to what the defendant did in the building.20 ' The defendant ar-gued that under Schwartz v. Commonwealth,"2 he could not be
convicted of perjury because conviction requires the testimony of
two witnesses or one witness and significant corroborating evi-dence.2"3 In affirming the trial court's conviction, the court held
that Schwartz was not applicable to this situation because oneperson's testimony was not being weighed against another per-
son's testimony.2 4 However, the dissent argued that Schwartz
193. Holley v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 158, 164, 562 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App.2002); see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370 (Cum. Supp. 2002). The court stated that the distance
between the defendant and the children was irrelevant if the defendant was visible to the
children. Holley, 38 Va. App. at 164, 562 S.E.2d at 354.
194. Holley, 38 Va. App. at 160, 562 S.E.2d at 352.
195. 37 Va. App. 575, 560 S.E.2d 455 (Ct. App. 2002).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 577, 560 S.E.2d at 455.
198. Id. at 577, 560 S.E.2d at 455-56.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 579, 560 S.E.2d at 457.
201. See id.
202. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 1025 (1876) (holding that one's statements alone are not suffi-
cient to convict of perjury).
203. Donati, 37 Va. App. at 576, 560 S.E.2d at 455.
204. Id. at 578, 560 S.E.2d at 456; see also 41 AM. JUR. Perjury § 66 ("A conviction for
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was applicable and the contents of the video was a question for
the fact-finder, but since there was no other corroborating wit-
ness, the evidence was insufficient." 5
4. Weapons Related Convictions
In Sykes v. Commonwealth,"6 the Virginia Court of Appeals de-
cided the issue of whether a razor blade constitutes a weapon un-
der the concealed weapon statute.2 7 The holding of a prior case,
O'Banion v. Commonwealth, °8 seemed to indicate that a razor
blade must have a handle in order to fit under the concealed
weapon statute.2 9 However, the Sykes court explained that
O'Banion concerned a box cutter-essentially a razor with a han-
dle-and that the holding in Sykes was not limited to razor blades
with handles. 210 Therefore, a razor blade with or without an at-
tached handle satisfies the definition of a concealed weapon in
Virginia Code section 18.2-308.211
In Armstrong v. Commonwealth,212 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a firearm does not need to be "operable" to sustain
a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon under Virginia
Code section 18.2-308.2.213
5. Miscellaneous Cases
In Bennet v. Commonwealth,214 the Virginia Court of Appeals
perjury cannot be sustained merely on the contradictory sworn statements of the defen-
dant, but the state must prove which of the two statements is false, and must show that
statement to be false by other evidence than the contradictory statement.").
205. Id. at 583, 580 S.E.2d at 459 (Benton, J., dissenting).
206. 37 Va. App. 262, 556 S.E.2d 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
207. Id. at 271, 556 S.E.2d at 798 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Cum. Supp
2002)).
208. 33 Va. App. 47, 531 S.E.2d 599 (Ct. App. 2000).
209. Sykes, 37 Va. App. at 272, 556 S.E.2d at 798-99 (citing O'Banion, 33 Va. App. at
59-60, 531 S.E.2d at 605).
210. Id. at 272, 556 S.E.2d at 799 (citing O'Banion, 33 Va. App. at 60, 531 S.E.2d at
605).
211. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
212. 263 Va. 573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002).
213. Id. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 145 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Cum.
Supp. 2002)).
214. 35 Va. App. 442, 546 S.E.2d 209 (Ct. App. 2001).
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reversed two convictions for felony assault on a police officer.215
The court held that words alone are not sufficient to sustain a
conviction for assault against a police officer.2 16
In Cotton v. Commonwealth,"7 the Virginia Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of felony murder."' The issue was whether
felony child abuse could be a predicate felony or whether the child
abuse merges with the murder charge.2"9 The court held that fel-
ony child abuse could be a predicate felony and further stated
that, to be a predicate felony, the felony must be related in time,
place, and causal connection to the death in question.22 °
In Tucker v. Commonwealth,22 the defendant was driving in
excess of the speed limit when a police officer signaled for him to
pull over.222 Instead, Tucker sped up, and a high speed chase en-
sued.223 The Virginia Court of Appeals clarified the meaning of
"driving so as to endanger a person" under Virginia Code section
46.2-817(B) 224 and established that a showing of actual endan-
germent of any person is not necessary to sustain a felony convic-
tion under Virginia Code section 46.2-817.225
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,226 the Virginia Court of Appeals
clarified that it is not necessary to prove a specific intent to inter-
fere under Virginia Code section 5.1-22, which criminalizes inter-
ference with the operation of an aircraft.227
The Virginia Court of Appeals held in Lawson v. Common-
wealth,22 that for purposes of a felony failure-to-appear warrant,
the defendant must actually be charged with a felony, not simply
215. Id. at 450, 546 S.E.2d at 212.
216. Id. at 449, 546 S.E.2d at 212.
217. 35 Va. App. 511, 546 S.E.2d 241 (Ct. App. 2001).
218. Id. at 514, 546 S.E.2d at 243.
219. Id. at 516, 546 S.E.2d at 244.
220. Id.
221. 38 Va. App. 343, 564 S.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 2002).
222. Id. at 344-45, 564 S.E.2d at 145.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 346-47, 564 S.E.2d at 146-47 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-817 (Repl.
Vol. 2002)).
225. Id.
226. 37 Va. App. 634, 561 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2002).
227. Id. at 642, 561 S.E.2d at 4; see also VA. CODE ANN.§ 5.1-22 (Repl. Vol. 1999 &
Cum. Supp. 2002).
228. 38 Va. App. 93, 561 S.E.2d 775 (Ct. App. 2002).
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fail to appear before a court in a show-cause hearing on an under-
lying felony.229
In Crislip v. Commonwealth,23 ° the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the phrase "in public" for a drunk-in-public charge
means to be in public view.23' The court refused to adopt a nar-
rower definition, advanced by the defendant, that "in public"
means a public place,232 and affirmed the trial court's conviction
finding that the defendant was "in public" on his own front porch
in plain view of neighboring homes and streets.233
B. Admissibility of Evidence
The Virginia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia decided a number of cases regarding the admissibility of
evidence this past year. The following examples merely compose
an illustrative list of these cases.
234
229. Id. at 97, 561 S.E.2d at 777.
230. 37 Va. App. 66, 554 S.E.2d 96 (Ct. App. 2001).
231. Id. at 71, 554 S.E.2d at 98.
232. Id. at 72, 554 S.E.2d at 99. The court found it irrelevant that the defendant was on
the premises of his own home for purposes of determining whether he was in public. Id.
233. Id.
234. See also Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 554 S.E.2d 84 (2001) (holding that
the trial court did not err in admitting out of court statements as party admissions where
the defendant was sufficiently identified as the person who made the statements via the
Internet); Weathers v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 803, 553 S.E.2d 729 (2001) (holding that
the trial court's decision to admit evidence of the defendant's prior convictions based on
only substantial compliance with applicable notice requirements was affirmed); Pearson v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 583, 560 S.E.2d 459 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding that a revocation
hearing is a continuation of original sentencing and therefore the defendant's prior record
is admissible); Goodman v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 374, 558 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App.
2002) (finding that incoherence, unconsciousness, or inability to refuse do not constitute a
refusal to give blood for DUI purposes); Summerlin v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 288,
557 S.E.2d 731 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding defendant's phone messages admissible to show
state of mind and intent); Brown v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 169, 554 S.E.2d 711 (Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of victim's
stepmother regarding victim's recent complaint of a sexual offense); Wolfe v. Common-
wealth, 37 Va. App. 136, 554 S.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. 2001) (regarding the admissibility of
evidence during sentencing hearing); Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 73, 554
S.E.2d 99 (Ct. App. 2001) (resolving the apparent conflict in requirements for admissibility
of intoxilyzer-5000 results, and finding that substantial compliance with procedures is suf-
ficient).
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1. Expert Witness Testimony
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed two issues on appeal
in the case of Pritchett v. Commonwealth."' During a trial for
murder, robbery, and attendant firearm charges, defense counsel
proffered testimony of a mental health expert regarding the sus-
ceptibility of mentally retarded persons to suggestive police inter-
rogation and the defendant's reaction to his interrogation by the
police."' The trial court "rejected the expert's testimony on the
ground that it 'would invade the province of the jury as to the ul-
timate issue of intent.' 237 However, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the testimony of a mental health expert regarding
the susceptibility of a mentally retarded person to suggestive po-
lice interrogation was admissible to assist the jury in determining
the reliability of the defendant's confession to the police.2"' The
court further held that the lower court's failure to allow this tes-
timony was not harmless error-because the defendant's reaction
to such an interrogation is an inadmissible comment on the verac-
ity of the defendant's trial testimony-and, therefore, remanded
the case for trial.239
In Velazquez v. Commonwealth,24 ° the defendant attempted to
limit the testimony of the expert witness, a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner ("SANE"). 241' During the rape trial, a SANE was per-
mitted to testify as an expert that the victim's injuries were both
"inconsistent with consensual intercourse," and that they were
"consistent with non-consensual intercourse."24 2 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the SANE was not qualified to give the
opinions because they constituted a medical diagnosis and the
SANE was not qualified to practice medicine. 243 The defendant
further contended that the opinions of the SANE were opinions
on the ultimate issue and thus invaded the province of the jury.244
235. 263 Va. 182, 557 S.E.2d 205 (2002).
236. Id. at 183, 557 S.E.2d at 206.
237. Id. at 187, 557 S.E.2d at 208.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 263 Va. 95, 557 S.E.2d 213 (2002).
241. Id. at 100, 557 S.E.2d at 216.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 101, 557 S.E.2d at 217.
244. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Velazquez that the tes-
timony concerning sexual assault diagnosis did not constitute the
practice of medicine and was admissible where the witness pos-
sessed adequate knowledge, training, and experience to render an
informed opinion.245 The court further held that part of the admit-
ted testimony addressed the ultimate issue of fact because the
SANE's opinion that the victim's injuries were consistent with
non-consensual intercourse, if believed, would preclude the jury
from reaching any decision other than that the victim suffered a
rape.246 The court, therefore, remanded the case for a new trial.247
2. Lay Witness Testimony
In Sapp v. Commonwealth,248 the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the issue of the admission of previous testimony when
the witnesses are unavailable due to fear of testifying. 249 During
the trial, both the alleged victim of a robbery and malicious
wounding and another witness for the Commonwealth refused to
testify for fear of reprisals. 2" The victim claimed that while no
one had threatened him "officially, [there were] ... maybe one or
two verbal threats," and the witness stated that he did not want
to testify due to "talk in the streets. '251 The trial court assured the
witnesses that they would not be forced to testify and found that
the witnesses were unavailable. 2  The Commonwealth then in-
troduced the witnesses' preliminary hearing testimony.2"3
The supreme court held that, at a minimum, a refusal to testify
should be met with an order from the trial court to testify.
25 4
Here, there was little, if any, judicial pressure to have the wit-
nesses testify.255 As a result, the admission of the preliminary
245. Id. at 104, 106, 557 S.E.2d at 219, 220.
246. Id. at 105, 557 S.E.2d at 219.
247. Id. at 106, 557 S.E.2d at 220.
248. 263 Va. 415, 559 S.E.2d 645 (2002).
249. Id. at 418, 559 S.E.2d at 646.
250. Id. at 418, 559 S.E.2d at 646-47.
251. Id. at 418, 559 S.E.2d at 646-48.
252. Id. at 422-23, 559 S.E.2d at 649.
253. Id. at 418-22, 559 S.E.2d at 646-49.
254. Id. at 426, 559 S.E.2d at 651.
255. Id.
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hearing testimony was found to be an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.2" 6
In the case of Smallwood v. Commonwealth,257 the Virginia
Court of Appeals addressed the difference between adverse testi-
mony and an adverse witness.25 A witness called by the Com-
monwealth gave testimony that the Commonwealth believed to be
false.5 9 The Commonwealth then asked the trial court to find the
witness to be an adverse witness and to allow the Commonwealth
to impeach.26 ° The court found, however, that the witnesses' tes-
timony was not injurious to the Commonwealth's case; therefore,
the Commonwealth could use leading questions to question the
witness, but could not impeach the witness.261
In Saunders v. Commonwealth,262 the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the transcript of a pre-
liminary hearing because the victim had died before trial.263
3. Other Admissibility Issues
In Quinones v. Commonwealth,264 a case concerning a prosecu-
tion for aggravated sexual battery and indecent liberties with a
minor, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled on the admissibility of
prior sexual misconduct and pornographic tapes found in the de-
fendant's apartment.265 The defendant allegedly abused his seven-
year-old step-granddaughter by rubbing baby lotion all over her
body, including her private parts.266 During the trial, the defen-
dant's daughter testified that when she was five years old, the de-
fendant asked her to touch or taste his penis.267 Also, during trial,
256. Id.
257. 36 Va. App. 483, 553 S.E.2d 140 (Ct. App. 2001).
258. Id. at 487-94, 553 S.E.2d at 142-45.
259. Id. at 488, 553 S.E.2d at 142.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 38 Va. App. 192, 562 S.E.2d 367 (Ct. App. 2002).
263. Id. at 197-98, 562 S.E.2d at 370.
264. 35 Va. App. 634, 547 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 2001).
265. Id. at 636-37, 547 S.E.2d at 525-26.
266. Id. at 638, 547 S.E.2d at 526.
267. Id. at 637-38, 547 S.E.2d at 526.
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a police officer testified that he seized "hardcore porno" tapes
from the defendant's apartment.6 8
The court of appeals held that the prior sexual misconduct was
too remote in time-almost twenty years earlier-and involved a
different type of misconduct than that of which the defendant was
currently accused.269 The court ruled that the prejudicial effect of
the testimony was not outweighed by the negligible probative
value; therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the testi-
mony.27 0 As to the admissibility of the pornographic tapes, the
court held that the trial court erred in admitting the tapes be-
cause the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value and
because the Commonwealth presented no evidence that the child
had been shown the tapes or that they had any relation to the
current case.
In Sabo v. Commonwealth,272 the victim was injured in an
automobile accident when her brakes failed.7 3 Believing that her
former boyfriend, the defendant, cut her brake lines, the victim
tape recorded a conversation with the defendant, a conversation
in which he eventually made incriminating statements about the
brakes.2 74 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the victim in
the case was not acting as a police agent even though the police
initiated the procedure for the victim to record telephone conver-
sations.275 Although she coaxed him into making incriminating
statements, the statements were voluntarily given and a proper
foundation was laid for admitting the tape. 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Scates v. Commonwealth,277
addressed the admissibility of evidence of other crimes committed
by the defendant.278 In a trial for breaking and entering and
grand larceny, the evidence showed that the defendant entered
268. Id. at 638, 547 S.E.2d at 526.
269. Id. at 637-38, 547 S.E.2d at 526.
270. Id. at 641, 547 S.E.2d at 528.
271. Id. at 642, 547 S.E.2d at 528.
272. 38 Va. App. 63, 561 S.E.2d 761 (Ct. App. 2002).
273. Id. at 68, 561 S.E.2d at 763.
274. Id. at 70, 561 S.E.2d at 764.
275. Id. at 76, 561 S.E.2d at 767.
276. Id.
277. 262 Va. 757, 553 S.E.2d 756 (2002).
278. Id. at 759, 553 S.E.2d at 757.
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the victim's home through an unlocked door." 9 The trial court al-
lowed a detective to testify that the defendant had admitted to
using a credit card to enter other homes and commit larcenies. 28 0
Because there was no evidence that the defendant had used a
credit card to unlock the door, the court found that evidence of
other crimes did not fall into any of the accepted exceptions for
such testimony.2 ' As a result, the supreme court held that both
the trial and appeals courts erred in allowing the testimony, and
the matter was remanded for a new trial.28 2
In the case of Clark v. Commonwealth,8 3 the Supreme Court of
Virginia clarified that a defendant does not have the right to an
independent medical exam of a rape victim. 28 4
C. Issues During Trial
1. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial
Although it is a well established rule that a defendant's waiver
of a jury trial must be voluntary, the Virginia Court of Appeals
clarified the meaning of "voluntary" in Robinson v. Common-
wealth.85 In this case, when the defendant requested a jury trial,
the trial court said the defendant could have a jury trial on the
condition that the court would increase the defendant's conditions
for bond.28 6 The defendant then waived his right to a jury trial.28 7
However, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that this choice was not a voluntary waiver.28 8
In the case of Commonwealth v. Williams,8 9 the trial court de-
nied the defendant's request for a jury trial after he had previ-
279. Id.
280. Id. at 760, 553 S.E.2d at 758.
281. Id. at 762, 553 S.E.2d at 759.
282. Id. at 763, 553 S.E.2d at 760.
283. 262 Va. 517, 551 S.E.2d 642 (2001).
284. Id. at 521, 551 S.E.2d at 644.
285. 36 Va. App. 1, 548 S.E.2d 227 (Ct. App. 2001).
286. Id. at 3-4, 548 S.E.2d at 228.
287. Id. at 6, 548 S.E.2d at 229.
288. Id.
289. 262 Va. 661, 553 S.E.2d 760 (2001).
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ously waived that right. 29" The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that it was within the discretion of the trial court to deny the de-
fendant's subsequent request for a jury trial, after having already
waived that right, without the trial court making any notation
that the first waiver was voluntary.291 Therefore, the court held
there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court.292
2. Waiver of Counsel
In McNair v. Commonwealth,293 the defendant was provided
with several, successively court-appointed attorneys to represent
him.294 At various times prior to trial, the defendant requested
the replacement of each court-appointed attorney, which the trial
court granted. 295 At trial, the defendant again asked that the
court replace his attorney, and the attorney made a motion to
withdraw. 296 The court granted the attorney's motion to withdraw
but denied the defendant's request for another attorney, at which
point the defendant proceeded to trial without counsel.297 The
Virginia Court of Appeals, en banc, held that this was not a vol-
untary waiver of counsel and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.29
3. Voir Dire
In DeLeon v. Commonwealth,299 the Virginia Court of Appeals
remanded a case for retrial because the trial court improperly de-
nied defendant's motion to strike a juror for cause.30 0 During voir
dire in the rape trial, a juror stated that her sister-in-law had
been raped and that she was "not sure" whether or not that would
290. Id. at 665, 553 S.E.2d at 761.
291. Id. at 671, 553 S.E.2d at 765.
292. Id.
293. 37 Va. App. 687, 561 S.E.2d 26 (Ct. App. 2002) (en banc).
294. Id. at 693, 561 S.E.2d at 29.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 692-94, 561 S.E.2d at 29.
297. Id. at 693-94, 561 S.E.2d at 29.
298. Id. at 695-97, 561 S.E.2d at 30-31.
299. No. 1595-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 364, at *1 (Ct. App. June 25, 2002).
300. Id.
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affect her hearing the case."°1 She was upset and stated she would
identify with the victim.0 2 However, she also stated that she was
not biased against the defendant and could listen to the evidence
fairly. 3 The trial court denied defendant's motion to strike the
prospective juror for cause.0 4 The court of appeals held that the
juror's responses failed to establish that she could sit as an im-
partial juror and created a reasonable doubt as to her fairness-a
factor that must be resolved in favor of the accused.30 5
In Barrett v. Commonwealth,0 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the trial court abused its discretion in not striking a
perspective juror who was the brother of a police officer who was
going to be a witness at trial.30 7 During voir dire, the prospective
juror stated that he could be impartial and follow the law.0 8 The
court held, however, that in order to avoid any appearance of im-
propriety and retain faith in the jury system, the trial court
should have struck the juror.309 The court remanded the case for
further proceedings.310
In Hill v. Commonwealth,311 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that a defendant had the right to voir dire prospective jurors with
respect to the sentencing ranges of the charges.1 2 The court said
that a defendant is entitled to an impartial jury-a jury that is
impartial not only as to the guilt and innocence portion of a bifur-
cated trial but also impartial as to sentencing.1 3 The only appro-
priate time to question potential jurors as to impartiality regard-
ing sentencing is during voir dire because that is when
peremptory strikes are available to remove any potential juror
who cannot be impartial. 4
301. Id. at*1-2.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at *3.
305. Id. at *4-6.
306. 262 Va. 823, 553 S.E.2d 731 (2001).
307. Id. at 824, 553 S.E.2d at 731.
308. Id. at 824-25, 553 S.E.2d at 732.
309. Id. at 826-27, 553 S.E.2d at 733.
310. Id. at 827, 553 S.E.2d at 733.
311. 36 Va. App. 375, 550 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 2001).
312. Id. at 381, 550 S.E.2d at 354.
313. Id. at 380-81, 550 S.E.2d at 353-54.
314. Id. at 381, 550 S.E.2d at 354.
[Vol. 37:45
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, however, and re-
versed the Hill decision." 5 It held that in a non-capital criminal
prosecution, the defendant does not have a constitutional or
statutory right to ask members of the jury panel questions re-
garding the range of punishment that may be imposed on the de-
fendant if he is ultimately convicted. 6 The court reasoned that
such questions "will only result in speculation by jury panel
members," and will be answered in a "factual vacuum."317 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that such questions are not relevant to
any of the four criteria set forth in Virginia Code section 8.01-
358-relationship to the parties, interest in the cause, formation
of opinions about the cause, or bias or prejudice-and, therefore,
they fall outside of the scope of the defendant's statutory and con-
stitutional rights.318 The court noted that questions regarding po-
tential sentencing are only relevant in capital murder cases, in
which the defendant may be sentenced to death.319
Similarly, in Hills v. Commonwealth,32 ° the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a defendant cannot question prospective jurors
regarding parole ineligibility during voir dire.32 ' The court held
that parole ineligibility is a question solely applicable during sen-
tencing and a jury instruction is sufficient. 22
4. Speedy Trial
In White v. Commonwealth,323 the Virginia Court of Appeals
dealt with the issue of what constitutes a speedy trial.324 The de-
fendant's case was already set for trial when the Commonwealth
realized that the date fell two days after the speedy trial dead-
line. 25 On the Commonwealth's motion, the trial court reduced
315. Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 012316, 2002 Va. LEXIS 104 (Va. Sept. 13, 2002).
316. Id. *8.
317. Id. at *7.
318. Id. at *8; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002)
(prescribing the guarantees of an accused's right to trial by an impartial jury).
319. Hill, 2002 Va. LEXIS 104, at *7.
320. 262 Va. 807, 553 S.E.2d 722 (2001).
321. Id. at 809, 553 S.E.2d at 723.
322. Id. at 812, 553 S.E.2d at 725; see also Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104,
122, 532 S.E.2d 629, 638 (2000).
323. 37 Va. App. 658, 561 S.E.2d 12 (Ct. App. 2002).
324. Id. at 660, 561 S.E.2d at 13.
325. Id. at 661, 561 S.E.2d at 14.
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the defendant's bond to a personal recognizance bond.326 The de-
fendant refused to endorse the bond and the sheriff released the
defendant from the jail.32v Without addressing whether the defen-
dant was still in custody after being released without signing the
bond, the court held that the defendant was not in custody for
purposes of speedy trial.32" The defendant had brought the con-
tinuation of his detention upon himself when he failed to endorse
the bond. 29
5. Jury Instructions
The appellate court also addressed a number of questions with
respect to jury instructions. On appeal, in deciding whether a
trial court erred in denying a requested jury instruction, the facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party who of-
fered the instruction. 33' As long as more than a "'scintilla... of evi-
dence exists to support the instruction, it should be given. 1
In Willis v. Commonwealth,332 the trial court refused to instruct
the jury on any of the lesser included offenses of first degree
murder, where the evidence indicated that a fight with and the
attempted robbery of the defendant by the victim preceded the
killing.33 3 However, because some time had elapsed between those
events and the killing, the court held that evidence of premedita-
tion was so clear that the trial court properly refused the lesser-
included instructions.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 661-62, 561 S.E.2d at 14.
328. Id. at 666, 561 S.E.2d at 16.
329. Id. at 667, 561 S.E.2d at 17.
330. Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 S.E.2d 220, 221 (2002) (citing
Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 469, 403 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1991)).
331. Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 352, 551 S.E.2d 620, 629 (2001) (quot-
ing Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 678, 283 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1981)).
332. 37 Va. App. 224, 556 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001).
333. Id. at 230-31, 556 S.E.2d at 63-64.
334. Id. at 231-32, 556 S.E.2d at 64. The appeal also raised a speedy trial issue. See id.
at 227-28, 556 S.E.2d at 62. Because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the of-
fense, a preliminary hearing was held in juvenile and domestic relations general district
court. Id. at 228, 556 S.E.2d at 62. However, the defendant had previously been tried as an
adult, which divested the juvenile court ofjurisdiction. Id. at 228-29, 556 S.E.2d at 62-63.
Therefore, even though the trial was held more than five months after the preliminary
hearing in the juvenile court, the speedy trial clock did not start at that point because that
court did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 229, 556 S.E.2d at 63.
[Vol. 37:45
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In Commonwealth v. Vaughn,35 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the
lesser-included offense of assault in a malicious wounding case.336
The court explained that "[the defendant] had no evidence dem-
onstrating that he did not intend to maim, disfigure, disable, or
kill... thus, under the circumstances [there is] no evidence sup-
porting the jury instruction requested by [the defendant]." ''
However, in Leal v. Commonwealth,33 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that assault by a mob is a lesser included offense of
malicious wounding by a mob, and the failure to instruct the jury
on the lesser offense was not harmless error. 39
In Tice v. Commonwealth,34 ° the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred by giving an instruction over the defen-
dant's objection. 41 The instruction allowed the jury to find him
guilty of capital murder based upon the theory that he acted in
concert with others to rape or kill the victim without requiring
the jury to find that he was an active or immediate killer.342 The
court of appeals found that the instruction was improper because
it allowed the jury to find Tice, an accessory, guilty of capital
murder when only the actual perpetrator of the murder can be
convicted of capital murder. 43
In Gaines v. Commonwealth,34 the Virginia Court of Appeals
dismissed a firearm conviction because the trial court improperly
rejected a jury instruction.345 The court of appeals found that
while the trial court rejected the instruction solely for its noncon-
335. 263 Va. 31, 557 S.E.2d 220 (2002).
336. Id. at 36, 557 S.E.2d at 223.
337. Id.
338. 37 Va. App. 525, 559 S.E.2d 874 (Ct. App. 2002).
339. Id. at 531-33, 537, 559 S.E.2d at 877-78, 880; see also Commonwealth v. Sands,
262 Va. 724, 553 S.E.2d 733 (2001) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing jury
instruction of self defense in spousal murder case); Byers v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App.
174, 554 S.E.2d 714 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing
jury instruction regarding possession of a firearm for self defense where it was not sup-
ported by the evidence).
340. 38 Va. App. 332, 563 S.E.2d 412 (Ct. App. 2002).
341. Id. at 335, 563 S.E.2d at 414.
342. Id. at 336, 563 S.E.2d at 414.
343. Id. at 339-40, 563 S.E.2d at 416.
344. 38 Va. App. 326, 563 S.E.2d 410 (Ct. App. 2002).
345. Id. at 331, 563 S.E.2d at 412.
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formance with model jury instructions, the instruction consituted
an accurate statement under Virginia Code section 19.2-263.2.348
6. Miscellaneous
The Virginia Court of Appeals remanded Thomas v. Common-
wealth347 because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of
the city and state where the alleged sexual abuse occurred-
merely presenting the street address did not suffice to establish
jurisdiction.14' Nothing in the record tied the "location to the lo-
cality within the Commonwealth."349 The court held, however,
that although "the Commonwealth's failure to prove jurisdiction
requires reversal of Thomas'[s] convictions, it did not require
dismissal of the charges again[st] him."350 Therefore, the court
remanded the case for rehearing.5 1
In Humphrey v. Commonwealth,52 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the common law defense of necessity remains
available, upon an appropriate factual predicate, as a defense to a
charge of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a
felony under Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2."'
In a separate case entitled Thomas v. Commonwealth,354 the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth was not
required to allege in an indictment the existence of a prior violent
felony to support the imposition of a mandatory sentence.35 How-
ever, if the indictment is for an offense with varying classes of
felonies or grades of offenses, the penalty is an element that the
Commonwealth must specifically allege in the indictment. 56
346. Id. at 330, 563 S.E.2d at 411-12; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-263.2 (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
347. 36 Va. App. 326, 549 S.E.2d 648 (Ct. App. 2001).
348. Id. at 332, 549 S.E.2d at 651.
349. Id. at 333, 549 S.E.2d at 651.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. 37 Va. App. 36, 553 S.E.2d 546 (Ct. App. 2001).
353. Id. at 40, 553 S.E.2d at 548; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Cum. Supp.
2002).
354. 37 Va. App. 748, 561 S.E.2d 56 (Ct. App. 2002).
355. Id. at 750-51, 562 S.E.2d at 57.
356. Id. at 753, 561 S.E.2d at 58; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474-
76 (2000) (holding that the Constitution "requirefs] that any fact... that increases the
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT
In Commonwealth v. Hicks,357 the Supreme Court of Virginia
overturned a trespassing policy employed by the Richmond Rede-
velopment and Housing Authority ("RRHA") as unconstitutional
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.358 In an effort to eradicate drug activity in a
low-income Richmond housing development, the housing author-
ity sought to bar persons who did not have a legitimate reason to
be on the property.359 The Richmond City Council enacted an or-
dinance that closed the streets in the development to the public
and deeded them to the housing authority.36 ° The RRHA erected
signs, but there was no barrier or other physical change to the
streets.361 The police arrested Hicks, whom the RRHA had previ-
ously barred for trespassing on the sidewalk of the develop-
ment.362 The court held that Hicks had standing because "in the
context of a First Amendment challenge, a litigant may challenge
government action granting government officials standardless
discretion even if that government action as applied to the liti-
gant is constitutionally permissible."363 Evidence established that
the housing authority had formulated no written policies or
guidelines on the enforcement of its trespass policy.364 Its unwrit-
ten policies gave the housing manager unfettered discretion to
determine who she authorized to be on the property.365 She could
allow people in to pass out literature, picket, demonstrate, hold
meetings, and the like, or keep them out, based solely on her per-
sonal viewpoint of the content of the speech involved.366 A citizen's
First Amendment rights cannot be predicated upon the unfet-
tered discretion of a government official; therefore, the unwritten
maximum penalty for a crime" beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the
fact of a prior conviction, "must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
357. 264 Va. 48, 563 S.E.2d 674 (2002).
358. Id. at 58, 563 S.E.2d at 680.
359. Id. at 51, 563 S.E.2d at 676.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 51-52, 563 S.E.2d at 676.
362. Id. at 53, 563 S.E.2d at 677.
363. Id. at 55, 563 S.E.2d at 678.
364. Id. at 59, 563 S.E.2d at 680.
365. Id. at 59-60, 563 S.E.2d at 680-81.
366. Id. at 60, 563 S.E.2d at 681.
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trespass policies of the authority were unconstitutionally over-
broad and unenforceable.367
VIII. CRIMES AND NEW LEGISLATION
A. Driving Offenses
The legislature clarified statutory language concerning DUrs
to require the warrant or indictment on which a person is con-
victed to allege that such person has previously been convicted of
an offense committed within the specified time period of five or
ten years.368 The same legislation also clarified that a person who
is convicted of driving under the influence for the second time
within ten years must forfeit his license for three years.369 Addi-
tionally, the legislature provided that a blood test is admissible as
a hospital business record in a prosecution for a DUI when the
test was taken in a hospital emergency room.37°
The General Assembly amended the law governing hit-and-run
incidents so that a hit-and-run that only results in property dam-
age of less than $1000 is now a Class 1 misdemeanor. 1 An acci-
dent that results in the injury or death of any person, or property
damage over $1000, is a Class 5 felony. 2
The legislature created the new offense of aggressive driving,
which provides that a person is guilty of aggressive driving if he
violates one or more of a list of traffic violations. 3 Examples of
these violations are: following too closely, failing to observe lanes
marked for traffic, and stopping on a highway with the intent to
harass, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person.374 Aggres-
sive driving shall be punished as a Class 2 misdemeanor; how-
367. Id. at 58, 563 S.E.2d at 680.
368. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
369. Id.
370. Id. § 18.2-268.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
371. Id. § 46.2-894 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
372. Id.
373. Id. §§ 46.2-492, -868.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
374. Id.
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ever, aggressive driving with the intent to injure another person
shall be punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor.375
Another new law creates a rebuttable presumption that the
driver has consumed an alcoholic beverage in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-323.1:
[I]f (i) an open container is located in the passenger compartment of
a motor vehicle, (ii) the alcoholic beverage in the open container has
been at least partially removed and (iii) the appearance, conduct,
odor of alcohol, speech, or other physical characteristic of the driver
of the motor vehicle may be reasonably associated with the consump-
tion of an alcoholic beverage.
376
A violation of this Code section is a Class 4 misdemeanor.377
B. Commonwealth Right of Appeal
Under prior law, to appeal from circuit court the Common-
wealth had to certify that the evidence at issue in the appeal was
essential to the proceedings.378 Under new law, the Common-
wealth only needs to certify "that the appeal is not taken for the
purpose of delay and that the evidence is substantial proof of a
fact material to the proceeding."379 Additionally, the legislature
expanded the Commonwealth's right of appeal by providing that
any circuit court sentencing order that is contrary to statutory
mandatory sentencing or restitution terms is appealable.8 °
C. Juvenile Law and Procedure
The legislature provided that the court may impose an adult
sentence on a juvenile tried as an adult and convicted of a violent
felony, but may order that a portion of the sentence be served in a
juvenile correctional facility.381
375. Id. § 46.2-868.1(B).
376. Id. § 18.2-323.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
377. Id.
378. Id. § 19.2-398 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
379. Id. § 19.2-398(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
380. Id. § 19.2-398(C).
381. Id. §§ 16.1-272, -285.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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Previously, a juvenile could have her privilege to have a
driver's license delayed or denied up to thirty days for a truancy
violation.8 2 Under new law, upon a second or subsequent truancy
offense, a juvenile's privilege to have a driver's license will be de-
nied for one year or until the juvenile reaches eighteen, which-
ever is longer. 83
Presumably in response to Salvatierra v. City of Falls
Church,"4 which decided the same issue for adults, the legisla-
ture clarified that a juvenile who is on probation or parole for an
offense that would be a Class 1 misdemeanor or a felony if com-
mitted by an adult, may be detained in a secure facility pursuant
to a detention order or warrant when there is probable cause to
believe he violated the terms of his probation or parole.8 5
In Panell v. Commonwealth,8 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that there is no constitutional requirement that a court ap-
ply a reasonable doubt standard or exclude hearsay in a juvenile
probation revocation proceeding.
38 7
This year, the legislature amended the "assault and battery"
provision of the Virginia Code.88 This amendment expands the
schoolteacher exceptions to the "simple assault" and "assault and
battery" definitions. 38 9 The exceptions now include a principal, as-
sistant principal, guidance counselor, or public security officer.39
D. New Crimes
The General Assembly provided that it is a Class 5 felony to
possess with the intent to injure another with a "radiologic
agent,"391 defined as any substance able to release radiation levels
that are "capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. "392 If
382. Id. § 16.1-278.9(A1) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
383. Id. § 16.1-278.9(A1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
384. 35 Va. App. 453, 546 S.E.2d 214 (Ct. App. 2001).
385. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
386. 263 Va. 497, 561 S.E.2d 724 (2002).
387. Id. at 499, 561 S.E.2d at 725.
388. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. § 18.2-52.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
392. Id. § 18.2-52.1.
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the person manufactures, sells, gives, distributes, or uses an in-
fectious "radiologic agent" with the intent to injure another, he is
guilty of a Class 4 felony.393
Presumably in response to the September 11th attacks, the leg-
islature provided that obtaining a Virginia driver's license or
identification card for any purpose other than engaging in an age
limited activity such as obtaining alcohol underage, is a Class 6
felony.394 The legislature also designated murder in the further-
ance of terrorism to be a capital crime, added search and rescue
and emergency medical services personnel to the section that
provides enhanced penalties for malicious bodily injury to law-
enforcement officers and fire-fighters, expanded wiretap capabili-
ties in response to terrorist activities, and restricted bail of a per-
son charged with a terrorist crime.39
The legislature provided that "any person who knowingly and
willfully makes any materially false statement or representation
to a law-enforcement officer who is in the course of conducting an
investigation of a crime by another is guilty of a Class 2 misde-
meanor."
396
The legislature has created a first offender program for under-
aged violators for the possession of alcoholic beverages, similar to
that for possession of marijuana.397 Finally, the legislature also
provided that a criminal trial is commenced at the point at which
"[double] jeopardy would attach or when a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is tendered by the defendant."398
393. Id. § 18.2-52.1(B).
394. See id. §§ 46.2-105.2, -308, -323.1, -324, -341.11, -341.15, -342, -345 (Repl. Vol.
2002).
395. See id. §§ 2.2-511, 15.2-1716.1, 18.2-18, -31, -46.4, -46.10, -51.1, -52.1, -60, -85,
19.2-61, -66, -70.2, -120, -215.1, -294, -386.1 to -386.5, 24.2-233 (Cum. Supp. 2002); see also
id. § 52-8.5 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
396. Id. § 18.2-460 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
397. Id. § 4.01-305 (Cum. Supp. 2002). A judge, "if the facts... justify a finding of
guilty ... without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent" of the underage first-
time offender, may "defer further proceedings and place [the defendant] on probation." Id.
§ 4.01-305(F).
398. Id. § 19.2-243(5) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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E. Changes to Existing Law
Sex offenders convicted of a second or subsequent violation for
an offense for which registration on the sex-offender registry is
required must continue to register for their lifetime.399 This provi-
sion was required to bring Virginia into compliance with the Ja-
cob Wetterling Act and to avoid the loss of federal funds under
that act.4 °°
In the domestic violence arena, the legislature redefined the
definition of domestic abuse to include reasonable apprehension
of any bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury as under
current law.40 1 The legislature also removed the provision that
marital rape cannot occur unless the spouses were living apart or
there was serious bodily injury caused by force or violence.4 2
The General Assembly increased the penalty for soliciting an-
other person to commit a murder from the current Class 6 felony
to a "term of not less than five years nor more than forty years."4 3
The legislature stepped up the penalty for animal cruelty to a
Class 6 felony if the individual causes the death of an animal by
torture or willfully inflicting inhumane injury or pain, or cruelly
beating, maiming, or mutilating such animal regardless of
whether the animal belongs to the person or another.4 4
In response to the recent case, Black v. Commonwealth, °5 in
which Virginia's cross-burning statute was found to violate the
First Amendment,4 6 the legislature added a new section to the
cross-burning statute to create a Class 6 felony for any person
399. Id. §§ 19.2-298.1, -298.2, -298.4, 46.2-323 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
400. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
170101, 108 Stat. 1786, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)).
401. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999). For further discussion of this amend-
ment, see Elizabeth P. Coughter & Ronald R. Tweel, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Fam-
ily Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 196 (2002).
402. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002). For further discussion of this is-
sue, see Coughter & Tweel, supra note 401, at 195-96.
403. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
404. Id. § 3.1-796.122(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
405. 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 (2001).
406. Id. at 779, 553 S.E.2d at 746.
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who "with the intent to intimidate another... burns any object
on the private property of another without permission."47
F. DNA
Effective January 1, 2003, a new law will require every person
arrested for a violent felony to submit a saliva or tissue sample
for DNA analysis. °8 However, if the court finds the individual not
guilty, or dismisses the case, the government must destroy the
sample upon written request or a court order to that effect. 9
IX. CONCLUSION
Those who practice criminal law are on the front lines of the
battle to protect the constitutional rights that we all hold so dear.
Because these rights are at stake every time a case is heard in
criminal court, questions as to what behavior should be criminal-
ized and what conduct by law enforcement should be counte-
nanced are hotly debated in the courts and in the legislature.
This year was no exception.
407. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-423.01, 19.2-398 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
408. Id. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
409. See id. §§ 19.2-310.2, -310.2:1, -310.2, -310.3:1, -310.4, -310.5, -310.7. (Cum. Supp.
2002).
20021

